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NINTH CIRCUIT SURVEY 
SUMMARIES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
NINTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
FEDERAL MAGISTRATE ACT OF 1979 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America v. Instromedix, 
Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Section 
636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979.2 
1. 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Kennedy, en bane consideration; Schroeder, 
with whom Pregerson and Canby join, dissenting), eert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3236 (1984). 
2. The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 28 U.S.C. §636(c) (1979), as added by Act of 
October 10, 1979, Pub. L. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643. Section 636(c) of the Federal Magis-
trate Act of 1979 was added to amend the current jurisdictional provisions for U.S. mag-
istrates in order to further clarify and expand the jurisdiction of U.S. magistrates and 
improve access to the federal courts for the less advantaged. Under this new section, 
magistrates have the authority to conduct civil trials and enter final judgment upon the 
consent of the parties. Section 636(c) (1), which was provided by the Act of October 10, 
1979, provides: 
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-
(1) Upon consent of the parties, a full-time United States 
magistrate or a part-time United States magistrate who serves 
as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all proceed-
ings in a jury or non-jury civil matter and order the entry of 
judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise 
such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves. 
Upon the consent of the parties, pursuant to their specific 
written request, any other part-time magistrate may exercise 
such jurisdiction, if such magistrate meets the bar member-
ship requirements set forth in section 631(b) (1) and the chief 
judge of the district court certifies that a full-time magistrate 
is not reasonably available in accordance with the guidelines 
established by the judicial council of the circuit. When there is 
more than one judge of a district court, designation under this 
paragraph shall be by the concurrence of a majority of all the 
203 
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Pacemaker instituted an action for patent infringement 
against Instromedix, and Instromedix counterclaimed for a dec-
laration of the patent's invalidity. The parties consented to have 
the case tried before a U.S. magistrate, pursuant to the local 
rules of Oregon and 28 U.S.C. §636(c). 
The magistrate held the patent valid, but not infringed. 
Both parties appealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit, sua 
sponte, raised the issue of the constitutionality of trial by a 
magistrate. The panel held the statute invalid and vacated the 
judgment.3 Subsequently, an order was issued granting a rehear-
ing en bane:' 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. The Majority 
The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing to determine the 
constitutionality of Section 636(c), and found it constitutional 
on two grounds. First, the court found that although the statute 
gave the appearance of granting article III authority to non-arti-
cle III judges, the ultimate control remained at all times with 
article III judges.G Additionally, the freely and voluntarily given 
consent of the parties to magistrates' jurisdiction cured any con-
stitutional defects in the section.8 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the proper standard to 
determine whether there was an improper interference or dele-
gation of the independent power of a branch of the federal gov-
ernment is whether the alteration prevents or substantially im-
pairs performance by the branch of its essential role in the 
constitutional system.7 The general rule is that if the essential 
constitutional role of the judiciary is to be maintained, there 
must be both the appearance and the reality of control by article 
III judges over the interpretation, declaration and application of 
federal law.s 
judges of such district court, and when there is no such con-
currence, then by the chief judge. 
3. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1983). 
4. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, Inc., 718 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1983). 
5. Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544-46. 
6. [d. at 542-43. 
7. [d. at 544. 
8. [d. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
2
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In Pacemaker,9 the Ninth Circuit held that the control of 
article III judges over magistrates under 28 U.S.C. §636(c) con-
tained sufficient protections against the erosion of judicial power 
to overcome the constitutional objections leveled against it.IO 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that the statute invests 
the article III judiciary with extensive administrative control 
over the management, composition and operation of the entire 
magistrate system. Magistrates are appointed by district 
judges,ll and subject to removal by them.12 In addition, district 
judges retain plenary authority over when, what and how many 
pretrial matters are assigned to magistrates. 13 
The court continued its constitutional analysis of Section 
636(c) stating that, if the section contained mandatory provi-
sions for trial of an unrestricted class of civil cases by a magis-
trate and not by an article III judge, it would be unconstitu-
tional. 14 However, the court also stated that the right to trial by 
an article III judge may be waived with the informed and volun-
50, 58-60 (1982); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1982). 
9. The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the control of article III judges over U.S. 
magistrates by declaring the historical significance of the attributes of article III judges: 
"The attributes of Article III judges, permanency in office and the right to an undimin-
ished compensation, are as essential to the independence of the judiciary now as they 
were when the Constitution was framed." 725 F.2d at 541. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78 
and 79 (A. Hamilton); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58-60; United States v. Will, 449 
U.S. 200, 217-21 (1980). The court further declared that the significance of these attrib-
utes, which were set forth to guarantee a separate and independent judiciary, "are pre-
sent constitutional necessities, not relics of antique ideas." 725 F.2d at 541. 
10. [d. In Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 667, the court emphasized that delegation to a non-
article III judicial officer is permissible as long as the ultimate decision is made by the 
district court. In Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3rd Cir. 1983), a case 
decided just before Pacemaker, the Third Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. §636(c) did not 
violate the Constitution for four reasons, all of which were included in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning. The four reasons are: (1) the reference to a magistrate is consensual; (2) 
the district judge has the power to vacate the reference; (3) the magistrate is appointed 
by the district judge, is a part of the district court, and is specially designated to try 
cases; and (4) the parties have a right of appeal to a district judge or the court of ap-
peals. 721 F.2d at 930. 
11. 28 U.S.C. §631. 
12. [d. 
13. Article III authority is also preserved in other respects. District courts retain the' 
power to adjudge a party in contempt. 28 U.S.C. §636(e). Sections 636(c) (3) and (4) 
provide for appellate review of the judgment of the magistrate by the appropriate court 
of appeals as a matter of right or, if the parties consent, by the district court. 28 U.S.C. 
§§636(c) (3), (4). Article III courts retain full authority over questions of law. 
14. 725 F.2d at 541. 
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tarily given consent of the parties. III 
In Wharton-Thomas v. United States, the Third Circuit 
concluded that consent of all parties under Section 636(c) cures 
any constitutional defects. 16 The Ninth Circuit adopted the 
Wharton- Thomas decision, noting that the Supreme Court has 
allowed criminal defendants to waive even fundamental rights.17 
The court pointed to these cases to support its conclusion that 
parties may waive personal rights to have cases heard by an arti-
cle III judge as long as the waiver is freely and voluntarily 
obtained. 
The Ninth Circuit offered several justifications for its con-
clusions regarding the importance of consent to magistrates' ju-
risdiction. First, the court pointed out that in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line CO./8 the Supreme 
Court's most recent interpretation of Article III, all the justices 
indicated that consent is important to the constitutional analy-
sis. IS The Ninth Circuit also gave considerable weight to the 
judgment that Congress has stated that consent of the parties 
eliminates constitutional objections.20 Congress added Section 
636(c) (2) in its 1979 Amendment to the Act in recognition of 
15.Id. 
16. 721 F.2d at 925-26. 
17. 725 F.2d at 543. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (right to be free 
from self-incrimination); Adams v. United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) 
(right to counsel); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (right to a 
speedy trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury trial); Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 243 (1968) (right to trial itself and guilty pleas). 
18. See supra note 8. 
19. 725 F.2d at 542. 
20. Id. at 542. The Senate Report to the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 gave ex-
plicit consideration to the importance of the consent of the parties, and states in part: 
This bill makes it clear that the voluntary consent of the par-
ties is required before any civil action may be referred to a 
magistrate. In light of this requirement of consent, no witness 
at the hearings on the bill found any constitutional question 
that could be raised against the provision. Near unanimity ex-
isted among the witnesses on the overall constitutionality of 
the bill. . . This bill clearly requires the voluntary consent of 
the parties as a prerequisite to a magistrate's exercise of the 
new jurisdiction. The committee firmly believes that no pres-
sue, tacit or expressed, should be applied to the litigants to 
induce them to consent to trial before the magistrates. 
S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 
1469, 1473. 
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the importance of consent.21 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that consent to magis-
trates' jurisdiction would not be acceptable if the alternative to 
trial by magistrate were the imposition of serious burdens and 
costs on the litigant.22 The court maintained that if it were 
shown that the choice was between trial before a magistrate or 
the endurance of delay or other measurable hardships not justi-
fied by the needs of judicial administration, then there would be 
a question as to whether any consent given was truly voluntary. 
However, the court found that no such burdens or hardships 
were demonstrated. The court further found that access to dis-
trict judges is not so restricted that adjudication of cases by 
magistrates is a compelled alternative.23 
In the last portion of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit dis-
missed the argument that in the federal system a party may not 
consent to jurisdiction, so that the parties may not waive their 
rights under article III. The court rejected this argument be-
cause it is only applicable where the parties attempt to confer 
upon an article III court a subject matter that Congress or the 
Constitution forbids.2 ' Patent law, the subject matter of the 
Pacemaker case, is exclusively one of federal law. The Supreme 
Court has explicitly held that Congress may confer upon federal 
courts jurisdiction conditioned upon a defendant's consent.211 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Section 636(c) does not 
expand article III jurisdiction but allows the transfer to another 
federal forum, comparing the consent to magistrates' jurisdiction 
to waiver of a defect in jurisdiction over the person, a waiver 
21. Section 636(c) (2), which was added by the Act of October 10, 1979, Pub. L. 96-
82, §2, 92 Stat. 643, provides: 
If a magistrate is designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under 
paragraph (1) of this subsection ... the decision of the par-
ties shall be communicated to the clerk of the court. Thereaf-
ter, neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt 
to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any 
civil matter to a magistrate. Rules of court for the reference of 
civil matters to magistrates shall include procedures to protect 
the voluntariness of the parties' consent. 
22. 725 F.2d at 543. 
23.Id. 
24.Id. 
25. Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 652 (1947); and Harris v. Avery Brundage 
Co., 305 U.S. 160 (1938). 
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federal courts permit.28 
B. The Dissent 
In a sharply-worded dissent, Judge Schroeder contended 
that the majority based its holding on three fundamentally mis-
guided assumptions: that the exercise of judicial power can de-
pend upon stipulations of the litigants; that magistrates who op-
erate under the thumbs of district court judges have the 
independence the Constitution is designed to ensure; and that 
consent to use of a magistrate can be presumed to be voluntary 
when the explicit purpose of the consensual provision of the 
Magistrate Act was to encourage certain classes of litigants to 
abandon their right to article III adjudication.27 The dissent ar-
gued that the Magistrate Act, and Section 636(c) in particular, 
create mutations in our system of government that transend its 
impact on individual litigants. The dissent was particularly con-
cerned that Section 636(c) would herald the loss of the indepen-
dent exercise of judicial power, the principal check on encroach-
ment by the legislative and executive branches, and also 
. legislative and executive checks on incursions by the judiciary.28 
The dissent also contended that the independence of the ju-
diciary is threatened even where district court judges maintain 
the appearance and reality of control over civil cases handled by 
magistrates because of the dangerous implications of judges hav-
ing control over other judges. This structure creates the poten-
tial for conflicts of interest for magistrates who must choose be-
1d. 
26. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960). 
27. 725 F.2d at 547. 
The first assumption is that under our constitutional system 
the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by arti-
cle III judges can depend upon stipulations of the litigants. 
The second is that magistrates, who operate under the thumb 
of the district court judges and whose salaries are not pro- . 
tected from retaliatory diminution by Congress. have the inde-
pendence the Constitution is designed to ensure. The third ia 
that consent to use of a magistrate can be presumed to be vol-
untary when the explicit purpose of the consensual reference 
provision of the Magistrates Act was to encourage certain clas-
ses of litigants to abandon their right to article III adjudica-
tion because existing overburdened district judges could not 
hear all cases promptly. 
28. 725 F.2d at 549. 
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tween what they conclude is right and the result they feel will 
please the district court. In this regard, Judge Schroeder main-
tained that under our Constitution no judge should be accounta-
ble to any other judge and that in reality, the control of district 
judges over magistrates prevents the independence of decision 
making. 29 
Finally, Judge Schroeder contended that the freely and vol-
untarily given consent of the parties was merely the "illusion of 
voluntary consent. "30 The dissent pointed out that the Federal 
Magistrate Act was perceived by Congress as a means to cope 
with an increasingly crowded federal docket, and that greater 
availability of magistrates would induce economically disadvan-
taged litigants, unable to afford the delay and cost of waiting for 
adjudication by an article III judge, to consent to trial before a 
magistrate.31 
The dissent strongly urged that this sort of freely and vol-
untarily given consent to magistrates' jurisdiction easily becomes 
coerced.32 The dissent noted that the majority and the Third 
Circuit in Wharton- Thomas 33 both admit that pressure on par-
ties to submit to magistrates' jurisdiction increases in direct pro-
portion to the number of magistrates positions.34 The majority 
argued that the process can be reversed when the situation be-
comes intolerable.35 The dissent disagreed and instead main-
tained that the Constitution should prevent this type of coercion 
from ever occurring.38 
29. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 715 (1979); Wal-
lace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe With Only Chiefs, 
1978 B.Y.V.L. REV. 39, 56; Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 V.S. 74 (1970). 
30. 725 F.2d at 553. 
31. Id. 
32.Id. 
33. 721 F.2d at 930-31. 
34. 725 F.2d at 554. 
35. Id. at 556. 
36. Circuit Judge Pregerson wrote a separate dissent to make one point. He noted 
that although magistrates perform important judicial functions, the mantle of indepen-
dence essential to article III decision making is withheld from them. To correct this situa-
tion, Judge Pregerson reasoned that "magistrates should be awarded Article III protec-
tions commensurate with the Article III work they now so commendably perform." 
Judge Pregerson's simple solution to the issue before the Ninth Circuit in Pacemaker 
was to make magistrates article III judges. Id. at 555. 
7
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III. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that the elements of control and the 
parties' consent present in 28 U.S.C. §636(c) are sufficient to 
overcome constitutional objections. In its conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit mentioned compelling policy reasons, in addition to the 
elements of control and consent, which require finding the sec-
tion constitutional. The reasons described were that article III 
courts have an increasing volume of cases and the assignment of 
certain matters to magistrates aids in the efficient administra-
tion of the judiciary. The court also reasoned that the legislature 
and the judiciary act responsibly when they provide and explore 
new, flexible methods of adjudication. Therefore, for both Con-
stitutional and compelling policy reasons, the Ninth Circuit 
found Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate constitutional. 
The dissent very succinctly pointed out the flaws in the ma-
jority's reasoning. And while a comparison of the dissent to the 
majority opinion may warrant the conclusion that the dissent 
has the Constitution on its side, there is one item noticeably 
missing from the dissent's reasoning. It offers no solution to the 
very real problem of an extremely overburdened judiciary. The 
majority therefore reached the only possible practical hold-
ing-that Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 is 
constitutional. 
Tova Zef/* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985. 
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SCHOOL DISTRICT'S RESTRAINT ON 
PUBLIC COMMENT BY EMPLOYEES: 
A FIRST AMENDMENT INFRINGEMENT 
In Anderson v. Central Point School District No. 6/ the 
Ninth Circuit held that a school district's "channels"2 policy in-
fringed upon activity protected by the first amendment. S The 
court rejected the school district's assertion that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Connick v. Myers" required a reversal of the 
lower court. Instead, the court distinguished Connick and found 
the communication in question to be protected activity. II 
Plaintiff, a teacher-coach employed by defendant school dis-
trict, attended and spoke at an open meetingS conducted by the 
Board of Education to discuss its athletic policies. Shortly there-
after, plaintiff sent a letter to members of the Board which pro-
posed changes in the district's athletic program. The letter was 
written in violation of the district's "channels rule" which re-
quired all employees to channel their remarks to the Board 
through the superintendent.' 
1. 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam; the panel members were Goodwin, J., 
Schroeder, J.J., and Aguilar, D.J., sitting by designation.) 
2. The district's "channels" policy required advance notice to the superintendent of 
any direct message sent to school board members by teachers. Defendants sought to jus-
tify the policy as furthering significant governmental interests in conserving the time of 
board members and permitting the administration the opportunity to comment on the 
accuracy of communications sent to the board. Anderson v. Central Point School District 
No.6, 554 F.Supp. 600, 608 (D. Or. 1982). 
3. The amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech . . ." U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. 
4. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Connick was a civil rights action in which plaintiff contended 
she was terminated from her job as an assistant district attorney because she exercised 
her right to free speech. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding the discharge was not 
offensive to the first amendment because the speech in question was not of public con-
cern. [d. at 140. 
5. 746 F.2d at 507. 
6. Plaintiff spoke for the five minutes allotted to each speaker at the meeting. [d. at 
506. 
7. The lower court had held the "channels" policy was an impermissible prior re-
straint on the right to free speech. 554 F.Supp. at 608. 
211 
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The superintendent responded by admonishing plaintiff for 
communicating directly with the Board and for his failure to 
send the proposal through the proper channels. Moreover, plain-
tiff was informed that he would not be assigned another coach-
ing job anywhere within the school district. 8 
Alleging his suspension resulted from the direct communica-
tion with the Board, plaintiff filed suit against the school district 
and the district's school superintendent under 18 U.S.C. § 1983.9 
Plaintiff claimed the communication was activity protected by 
the first amendment and sought an injunction against applica-
tion of the "channels" policy. He also sued for damages for 
physical and emotional distress and injury to his reputation and 
employability.lo After a jury trial and verdict for the plaintiff, 
the lower court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the 
school district's application of the policy to matters of public 
concern.ll Defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The primary issue considered by the Ninth Circuit was 
whether the lower court's decision was consistent with the Su-
preme Court's holding in Connick. 12 Initially, the court noted 
that the lower court properly applied the test stated in Picker-
ing v. Board of EducationlS in balancing the interest of the par-
ties. 14 The court pointed out that the parties in a pretrial motion 
8. The suspension from coaching was rescinded at a later date. 746 F.2d at 506. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979), states in relevant part: "Every person who ... under 
color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects ... any citizen ... 
to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured . . . for redress." 
10. 746 F.2d at 506. 
11.Id. 
12.Id. 
13. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Court in Pickering held the dismissal of a high school 
teacher for open criticism of the Board of Education on a matter of public concern, was 
impermissible under the first amendment. Id. at 574. 
14. 746 F.2d at 506. The lower court noted that the guidelines set forth in Pickering 
were relevant in balancing the interest of the parties, including: 1) whether maintenance 
of discipline by immediate supervisors would be affected by plaintiff's criticism; 2) 
whether plaintiff's employment relationship with the board was so personal and intimate 
that public criticism would undermine that relationship; 3) whether the employment re-
lationship demanded personal loyalty and confidence; 4) whether plaintiff deliberately 
made false statements; and, 5) whether plaintiff's claims would impede his performance 
as a teacher or hinder the actual operation of the school beyond their tendency to anger 
the board. 554 F.Supp. at 606. The lower court also emphasized that the Pickering anal-
10
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had agreed that the letter addressed matters of public concern, 
one of the factors considered under the Pickering analysis. III 
Defendants argued the Connick decision was applicable be-
cause although it had been stipulated that parts of the letter 
addressed matters of public concern, the letter contained details 
which were not of interest to the public. The court, however, dis-
tinguished Connick as a situation in which the employee's com-
munication addressed matters of personal interest, not matters 
which were of concern to the public. IS 
The Ninth Circuit noted that Connick reiterated an impor-
tant principle set forth in Pickering. Where an issue is a matter 
of legitimate public concern, free and open debate is vital to the 
decision making process.17 The court explained that Connick did 
not justify finding the plaintiff's letter to be a communication 
not protected by the first amendment because it contained de-
tails not of public interest. Instead, the court made it clear that 
under Connick, the test of whether an employee's speech ad-
dressed a matter of public concern must be determined by the 
content, form, and context of a given statement as revealed by 
the whole record. IS Applying that standard, the court concluded 
the subject matter of the letter was of public concern and did 
not lose its status as a protected communication because it con-
tained some details some details not of interest to the public.19 
The court then addressed the defendants' contention that 
the injunction was overly broad in that it barred enforcement of 
any policy which prohibited direct communication by teachers 
with members of the Board of Education on matters of concern 
to the public.20 The court stated that the defendants' assertion 
was without merit because no case law supports the proposition 
that there may be matters of public concern to which a "chan-
ysis considered that the operation of a school system is of general public concern, there-
fore those involved in its operation have the right to address pertinent issues. [d. 
15. 746 F.2d at 507. 
16. [d. 
17. [d. The Supreme Court in Pickering went on to conclude that teachers should 
be able to comment freely on issues which touch upon the operation of the school sys-
tem. 391 U.S. at 572. 
18. 746 F.2d at 507. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
11
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nels" policy might apply.21 Additionally, the court emphasized 
the injunction was within the limits of Connick and that the fo-
cus of the controversy was not the boundaries of the injunction, 
but rather the actual prohibitions placed on plaintiff's right to 
comment on matters of public concern.22 
Also without merit was defendants' contention that the ac-
tion should be one for defamation rather than for violation of 
plaintiff's civil rights under section 1983.23 In rejecting this argu-
ment, the court observed that the damages claimed under the 
statuteU must be tailored to the protected interest. According to 
the court, since the protected interest was plaintiff's first 
amendment rights, the award for damages resulting from a vio-
lation of those rights was consistent with the statute.211 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's approach indicates that the free speech 
rights of school teachers will not be abridged when they com-
ment on matters of public concern. The court's application of 
the Pickering test to weigh a teacher's first amendment interest 
with those of the state in promoting efficient public service, also 
affirms the viability of that test in the Ninth Circuit. 
When there is a question as to whether a communication is 
of public concern, the court's opinion suggests it will focus on 
the subject matter of the statement. In the future, courts should 
acknowledge, as the court did here, that statements of public 
concern should not lose their protected status under the first 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. at 508. The court also disposed of three other arguments raised by the defen-
dants: 1) the challenge that the jury instructions were improper was rejected; 2) the con-
tention that the superintendent was entitled to good faith immunity was held invalid in 
light of Pickering; and, 3) the claim that award of attorney's fees was inappropriate was 
accepted insofar as the court remanded that aspect of the case to correct any discrepancy 
which might be apparent. [d. 
24. See Busche v. Burke, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). 
In Busche, the court held that in a Section 1983 action, plaintiff could receive damages 
for mental and emotional distress by demonstrating that the injury was caused by the 
infraction. 649 F.2d at 519 n. 13. 
25. 746 F.2d at 508. See also, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
12
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amendment simply because they contain some details not of in-
terest to the public. 
Samuel Santistevan* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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ZONING AND THE SUPPRESSION OF FREE SPEECH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton/ a municipal 
zoning ordinance restricted the location of adult motion picture 
theaters.2 The Ninth Circuit ruled that a substantial state inter-
est to justify that ordinance could not be found where the City 
had relied solely on the experiences of other towns and cities,3 
and that the existence of predominately legitimate concerns be-
hind the ordinance did not establish that the regulation was un-
related to the suppression of speech.4 
In April, 1981, the City of Renton, Washington passed a 
zoning ordinance, which restricted the location of adult motion 
picture theaters to only 520 acres of the area encompassed by 
the City.o Most of those 520 acres, however, were unavailable.s 
At the time the ordinance was passed, there were no adult 
theaters located in Renton.7 However, in January, 1982, Play-
time Theaters acquired an existing movie theater in which it 
wanted to use to exhibit adult motion pictures. S The theater was 
1. 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Fletcher, J.; the other panel members were Far-
ris, J., and Jameson, J., sitting by designation). 
2. Renton, Wash., Ordinance 3526 (April 1981). The ordinance prohibited the loca-
tion of the theaters within 1000 feet of any residential zone or single or multiple family 
dwelling, any church or other religious institution, and any public park or area zoned for 
use as a public park. In addition, the ordinance prohibited any such theater from locat-
ing within one mile of any public or private school. 
The ordinance was amended after initiation of the litigation. An elaborate statement 
for the enactment of the ordinance was adopted, and the required distance from schools 
was reduced from one mile to 1,000 feet. 
3. 748 F.2d at 537. 
4.Id. 
5. Id. at 534. 
6. Id. A substantial part of the area was occupied by a sewage disposal and treat-
ment plant, a horseracing track, a business park suitable only for industrial use, a ware-
house and manufacturing facilities, an oil tank farm, and a fully developed shopping 
center. 
7. Id. at 530. 
8.Id. 
216 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/7
1985] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 217 
within the area where adult pictures were proscribed by the 
ordinance. 
Playtime filed an action in federal court seeking both a dec-
laration that the ordinance was unconstitutional and a perma-
nent injunction against its enforcement. Subsequently, the City 
of Renton brought suit in state court seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the ordinance was constitutional on its face and as 
applied to Playtime's proposed use. Renton moved to dismiss 
Playtime's federal action on the ground that the federal court 
should abstain in favor of the state action. The district court 
denied the motion,9 and eight months later granted a prelimi-
nary injunction.10 
Subsequently, Playtime began exhibiting adult motion pic-
tures at one of its theaters. The district court then vacated the 
preliminary injunctionll and denied the permanent injunction, 
finding that the ordinance furthered a substantial state interest, 
was unrelated to the suppression of speech, and was no more 
restrictive than necessary to further the state interest.12 Play-
time appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit first determined that abstention was not 
mandated. lS The Court then examined whether the zoning ordi-
9.Id. 
10. Id. at 532. 
11.Id. 
12.Id. 
13. In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), the Supreme Court 
held that a federal court, when asked for an injunction, should avoid needless friction 
with state policies which might result from tentative construction of state statutes and 
premature adjudication on their constitutionality. Id. at 500. 
The Ninth Circuit has devised three factors, all of which must be applicable, in 
order to abstain under Pullman. They are: (1) the suit must touch a sensitive area of 
social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative for 
adjudication exists; (2) a definitive ruling on the state issue in question must be capable 
of ending the controversy; and, (3) the possibly determinative issue of state law must be 
doubtful. J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482, 487-88 (9th Cir. 1984). 
In Playtime Theaters, the Ninth Circuit found absention not necessary due to the 
strong federal interest in first amendment cases. It noted that absention could result in 
the suppression of free speech, but would not eliminate or materially alter the constitu-
tional issues presented. 748 F.2d at 532. 
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts 
should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary cir-
15
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nance was constitutional. 
In United States v. O'Brien,14 the United States Supreme 
Court held that in the regulation of non-speech a sufficiently im-
portant governmental interest can justify incidental limitations 
on first amendment freedoms. 111 It determined that a govern-
ment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the consti-
tutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and, if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 18 
In considering the existence of a substantial state interest, 
the Ninth Circuit found the record, as presented by Renton, to 
be very thin.17 The ordinance itself contained only conclusory 
statements,18 no record of the public hearing had been made, 
and those who had attended it remembered little other than 
that it had happened.19 The Court pointed out that in other 
cases, where similar ordinances had been held constitutional, 
such ordinances were the product of either the "culmination of a 
long period of study and discussion" or "reports and affidavits 
cumstances, and that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" does not 
in itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it. [d. at 41, 54. 
The Ninth Circuit has refused to extend this rule generally to civil cases. Goldie's 
Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1984). Those civil cases to 
which it has been extended have arisen in a criminal or quasi-criminal context. [d. at 
469-70. The Ninth Circuit has devised a test for application of the Younger rule to a civil 
suit: the civil suit must bear a similarity to criminal proceedings or otherise implicate 
state interests vital to the operation of state government. Miofsky v. Superior Court, 703 
F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983). 
The Playtime Theaters court found that a civil case seeking only declaratory relief 
does not have such characteristics, 748 F.2d at 533, and consequently, since Playtime 
Theaters had not violated the ordinance prior to challenging it, the case was not subject 
to a Younger abstention. [d. 
14. 391 U.S. 366 (1968). 
15. [d. at 376. 
16. [d. at 377. 
17. 748 F.2d at 536. 
18. [d. An elaborate statement of reasons for the enactment of the ordinance was 
contained in the amendment passed after the initiation of the litigation. The reasons 
included statements such as that various areas in the City "should be free of adult en-
tertainment land uses," that "the image of the City ... will be adversely affected by the 
presence of adult entertainment land uses" and that "such land uses should be separated 
from uses with characteristics different from itself." [d. at 530 n.3. 
19. [d. 
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from sociologists and urban planning experts."20 
Renton had not studied the effects of adult theaters, nor 
had it applied any such findings to the particular problems or 
needs of Renton.21 The district court had found a substantial 
state interest only by considering Renton's reliance on the ex-
periences of other towns and cities.22 
The Ninth Circuit held that, although Renton could have 
used the experience of other cities as part of the relevant evi-
dence upon which to base its actions, such experiences simply 
are not sufficient to sustain the city's burden of showing a signif-
icant governmental interest.2s 
Renton also had to show that its zoning decision was "moti-
vated by a desire to further a compelling governmental interest 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression," to satisfy the 
O'Brien test.24 The record submitted to the Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, raised an inference that a motivating factor behind the or-
dinance was suppression of the content of the speech, rather 
than mere regulation of the effects of the mode of that speech, 
because many of the stated reasons for the ordinance were no 
more than expressions of dislike for its content.211 Because the 
city had little empirical evidence demonstrating the alleged dele-
terious effect of adult theaters, it failed to rebut this inference.28 
The district court upheld the ordinance because it found 
Renton's predominate concerns were legitimate.27 However, 
where there are mixed motives, as in this case, the court must 
determine whether a motivating factor in the zoning decision 
was to restrict the exercise of first amendment rights.28 If so, the 
zoning ordinance is impermissible.29 
20.Id. 
21. Id. at 537. 
22. Id. at 536. 
23. Id. at 537. 
24. Id. (citing Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1983». 
25. 748 F.2d at 537. 
26.Id. 
27.Id. 
28. Id. (quoting Tovar, 721 F.2d at 1266). 
29. 721 F.2d at 1266. 
17
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Renton failed to rebut the inference that a motivating fac-
tor behind the ordinance was suppression of the content of the 
speech. Therefore, Renton failed to show that its regulation was 
unrelated to the suppression of speech.30 
Renton argued that even if it had effectively banned adult 
theaters, the ordinance was constitutional because similar adult 
theaters existed in nearby Seattle.31 The Court pointed out, 
however, that such an argument was rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,32 because the 
liberty of expression in appropriate places may not be abridged 
on the ground that it may be exercised in some other place.33 
III. CONCLUSION 
The zoning ordinance passed by Renton created a substan-
tial restriction on speech. There remained virtually no location 
where an adult motion picture theater could operate. Because of 
the nature of the statements made by the City in its amended 
ordinance, it is apparent that at least part of its motivation was 
the elimination of such theaters from Renton solely because of a 
dislike for the content of the pictures. 
Although a municipality clearly has the power to make zon-
ing decisions for the health and welfare of its citizens,34 such de-
cisions may not subsume first amendment rights.3& Strict re-
quirements for the restriction of free speech have been designed 
by the Supreme Court for the protection of this constitutional 
right, and the City of Renton failed to demonstrate that its ac-
tions were within these requirements. The Ninth Circuit recog-
nized this failure, and correctly revers'ed the decision of the dis-
trict court sustaining the ordinance. 
Martis McAllister* 
30. 748 F.2d at 537·38. 
31. ld. at 538. 
32. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
33. 748 F.2d at 538 (citing Schad, 452 U.S. at 76·77). 
34. 748 F.2d at 534. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32·33 (1954). 
35. 748 F.2d at 534. See also Schad, 452 U.S. at 68. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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NINTH CIRCUIT NARROWS THE SCOPE 
OF SEX-BASED WAGE DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Spaulding v. University of Washington,l the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected plaintiffs' claim charging the defendent with sex-
based wage discrimination2 under 42 U.S.C. §1983,s the Equal 
Pay Act4 and Title VII to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 
In March 1972, members of the school of nursing faculty 
filed a petition with the University alleging sex-discrimination.e 
The University subsequently responded with a salary increase,' 
but the nursing faculty remained dissatisfied.8 Subsequently, 
plaintiffs applied for, and the United States Department of Jus-
tice issued, a right to sue letter to plaintiffs who ultimately filed 
1. 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.) (per Wallace. J.; the other panel member was Schroeder. 
J. concurring) cert. denied. _U.S._. 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984). 
2. 740 F.2d at 691-92. 
3. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982) states: 
"Every person who ... subjects. . .any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation 
of any rights. privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law. suit in equity or other proper proceeding 
for redress." 
4. 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1) (1982) states: 
No employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on 
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees. . .at a rate less 
than the rate he pays wages to employees of the opposite 
sex .. .for equal work ... which requires equal skill. effort and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 
conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) 
a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which 
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) 
a differential based on any other factor ... than sex. 
5. In relevant part 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1982) states: 
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail to refuse to 
hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation. . .of employment, because of such individual's ... sex .... " 
6. 740 F.2d at 692. 
7.Id. 
8.Id. 
221 
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suit.S 
In August of 1977, the district court referred the case to a 
federal magistrate. Io The magistrate sat as special master and 
heard the merits of the case,l1 whereupon he stated that he 
planned to dismiss the action. I2 While preparing his findings and 
conclusions, the Ninth Circuit decided Gunther v. County of 
Washington. IS After requesting memoranda from the parties on 
the effect of Gunther on his ruling, the special master concluded 
that Gunther did not alter the outcome of the case. As a result, 
he recommended that the district court dismiss.14 After an ap-
peal,III the district judge reviewed the magistrate's findings of 
fact under the clearly erroneous standard and adopted them. IS 
On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the district court erred in 
not reviewing the special master's findings de novo,17 that the 
district court erred in holding that the nursing faculty had failed 
to establish the substantially equal work requirement of the 
Equal Pay Act,I8 and that the district court erred in holding that 
the University had not violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
9. During the interim a group entitled the Woman's Salary Inequity Committee was 
formed. It sent a letter to the Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare and to the Washington State Human Rights Commis-
sion. The Committee then filed charges with the Equal Opportunity Commission and the 
University's Human Rights Commission. Id. at 692-93. 
10. The district judge sua sponte referred the case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
5(f)(5), FED. R. CIV. P. 53, and Local MAG. R. 21. Id. at 693. 
11. Id. The order of reference expressly required the magistrate to hear the case on 
the merits and to report recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law and disposi-
tion back to the district court. This procedure is pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e). [d. 
12. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) a magistrate may grant a defendant's motion for 
involuntary dismissal. The magistrate had concluded that the nursing faculty had failed 
to show that they performed substantially equal work compared to male faculty mem-
bers in other departments and that the Equal Pay Act standard governed claims under 
Title VII and section 1983. Id. 
13. 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979) aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The Ninth Circuit held 
that a plaintiff who fails to show that she performs substantially equal work is not pre-
cluded from suing under Title VII for relief from intentionally discriminatory compensa-
tion practices unless such practices are authorized by one of the four Equal Pay Act 
affirmative defenses. 623 F. 2d at 13lO-13. 
14. 740 F.2d at 693. 
15. Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 676 F. 2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1982). The court held that 
the special master was required to file a transcript of the proceedings before him with 
the district court. Id. at 1235. 
16. 740 F.2d at 693. 
17. Id. at 694. 
18. Id. at 696. 
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of 1964.19 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS. 
After holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) re-
quires that a special master's findings of fact should be accepted 
unless clearly erroneous,20 the Ninth Circuit turned to the merits 
of plaintiffs' Equal Pay Act claim.21 Plaintiffs argued that they 
had performed substantially equal work. To meet their burden, 
plaintiffs compared their jobs to those of male faculty members 
of other schools in the university22 and used statistics.2s 
With regard to the Equal Pay Act, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that it prohibits an employer from discriminating in wage pay-
ments on the basis of sex.24 To make out a prima facie case 
under the Act the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing it 
did not receive equal pay for substantially equal work.21i If a 
prima facie case is established, defendant may attempt to show 
that the disparity is based on either a seniority system, a system 
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or 
a factor other than sex.2S Under the Act equal work is measured 
by comparing jobs on the basis of skill, effort, responsibility and 
similar working conditions.27 Actual job performance and con-
tent, rather than job descriptions, are determinative.2s 
Plaintiffs contended that they performed substantially 
19. [d. at 699. 
20. [d. at 695-96. The court stated that it was Congress' intent in citing FED. R. CIV. 
P. 53(b) in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(O(5) to require courts to adopt a special master's findings 
of fact unless clearly erroneous. [d. at 695 (citing White v. General Services Administra-
tion, 652 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1981». Therefore, the court held that it should not under-
take its own de novo review of the magistrate's findings. [d. at 696. 
21. 740 F.2d at 696. 
22. [d. The other schools included "health services, social work, architecture, urban 
planning, environmental health, speech and hearing, rehabilitative medicine and phar-
macy practice." [d. 
23. [d. at 697. The statistics attempted to compare sixty-six individual faculty mem-
bers from selected departments with members of the nursing faculty "based on degrees 
held, experience and merit." [d. 
24. 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(I). 
25. 740 F. 2d at 696-97. See Hein v. Oregon College of Education, 718 F. 2d 910, 913 
(9th Cir. 1983); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1954). 
26. 740 F.2d at 696-97. 
27. [d. at 697. 
28. [d. Each claim, therefore, must be determined on a case-by-case basis. [d. 
21
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equal work to that performed by specified comparator29 faculty 
members. Plaintiffs argued both jobs required "preparation and 
teaching of courses, research and publication, committee work, 
advising of students and community service. "30 The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that although the comparator faculty positions 
were facially similar, the special master was correct in conclud-
ing that plaintiffs had now shown substantial equality between 
jobs.sl The court stated that the University's departments 
placed varying degrees of emphasis on skills and that nursing 
historically had been considered a discipline distinct from the 
comparators' professions.32 The court found the statistical evi-
dence plaintiffs used to show substantial work inadequate.33 Be-
cause an adequate showing of substantially equal work was not 
shown by plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of the Equal Pay Act claim.34 
In addressing the nurses Title VII claim, the Ninth Circuit 
directed its inquiry to whether plaintiffs had established a 
prima facie case.SII Under Title VII, a plaintiff has two theories 
or models available in litigation. Under the disparate treatment 
model, plaintiff must show proof of discriminatory actions taken 
by an employer from which a discriminatory motive can be 
inferred.38 
The court stated that under Gunther a Title VII cause of 
29. A "comparator" is the legal term for a person or group used by plaintiffs who are 
benefitting from the unequal pay scale. 
30. 740 F. 2d at 697. 
31. 1d. The district judge adopted that finding and the Ninth Circuit concluded it 
was not clearly erroneous. 
32. 1d. at 697-98. 
33. 1d. at 698. With regard to the statistical evidence, the court stated: "It did not 
adequately account for prior job experience, rank or multiple degrees, and, most impor-
tant, it did not adequately evaluate the actual work performed by various faculty mem-
bers." 1d. In a broader statement the court argued that "statistical evidence may demon-
strate a pay disparity, but a difference in pay between jobs which women primarily hold 
and jobs which men primarily hold does not state a prima facie Equal Pay Act case if 
the jobs are not substantially equal." 1d. See Horner v. Mary Institute, 613 F. 2d 706, 
715 (8th Cir. 1980). 
34. 740 F.2d at 698-99. 
35. 1d. at 699. 
36. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 
n. 15 (1977); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Again, each 
case must be decided on its particular facts. 740 F. 2d at 700. 
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action exists outside of the Equal Pay Act.37 The Ninth Circuit 
noted that it would not articulate the minimum factors neces-
sary for a plaintiff to establish a Title VII cause of action con-
cerning sex-based wage discrimination.38 However, since plain-
tiffs were unable to show substantial equality between jobs, the 
court held that disparity in wage compensation alone was insuf7 
ficient to establish a prima facie case.3S Under the court's analy-
sis plaintiffs were then required to prove intent to discriminate 
to make out a case of disparate treatment.40 
The nurses argued that the district court was clearly errone-
ous in not finding discriminatory intent based on the proffered 
testimony, evidence of an alleged predisposition toward discrim-
inatory conduct by various university officers and statistics.41 
The Ninth Circuit found that all of the evidence taken seper-
ately, and in bulk, was insufficient to support an inference of an 
illegally discriminatory motive on the part of the University.42 
Therefore, the district court's finding was affirmed.43 
The Ninth Circuit then turned to plaintiffs' second Title 
VII theory, disparate impact.44 The court stated that the ele-
ments of this cause of action are the occurence of certain out-
wardly neutral employment practices, and a significant adverse 
or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular sex by the 
employer's facially neutral acts or policies.4!! Under this model, 
37. 740 F.2d at 699 (citing Gunther, 623 F. 2d at 1321. "[A] plaintiff is not pre· 
cluded from establishing sex-based wage discrimination under some other theory [than 
substantial equality] compatible with Title VII."). 
38. 740 F.2d at 697. 
39. Id. "We will not, therefore, infer intent merely from the existence of wage differ-
ences between jobs that are only similar. Gunther does not require this." Id. 
40. Id. at 701. The nurses had argued for an interpretation of Gunther which the 
court called the "comparability plus" test. Id. Under this test the court would require 
"only some degree of job comparability plus some combination of factors including direct 
and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory conduct and pay disparities." Id. The 
court vehemently rejected this test and stated: "[S]uch an unwieldy test might allow 
plaintiffs to bolster inadequate showing of comparability with a confusing potpourri of 
plus factors, plunging courts into standard less supervision of employer/employee rela-
tions." Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 701-04. 
43. Id. at 701. 
44. Id. at 705. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The court 
stated that Title VII protects people from "not only overt discrimination but also prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." 
45. Id. 
23
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plaintiffs are not required to prove a discriminatory motive, 
however, they must prove the discriminatory impact at issue.46 
In evaluating the nurses' arguments, the court reasoned that 
since there had been no showing of substantially equal work, 
plaintiffs had only the comparable worth theory upon which to 
rely.47 As a threshold inquiry, the Ninth Circuit asked whether 
the disparate impact model should be available to plaintiffs who 
"make a broad-ranging sex-based claim of wage discrimination 
based on comparable worth. "48 Answering this difficult issue in 
the negative, the court stated that such "an extension of Title 
VII would plunge us into uncharted and treacherous areas."49 
Therefore, the court held that the Title VII disparate impact 
model does not encompass sex-based wage discrimination claims 
between comparable jobs.IIO Since the nursing faculty was unable 
to show a facially neutral policy which caused wage discrimina-
tion, their disparate impact arguments were rejected. III 
46. [d. at 708. The court stated: "What matters is the substance of the employer's 
acts and whether those neutral acts are a non-job-related pretext to shield an indvidious 
judgment." 
47. [d. The court summarized plaintiffs' case as follows: "[Tlhey have shown a dis-
parate impact by showing a wage disparity between only comparable jobs and this dispa-
rate impact is caused by the facially neutral policy or practice of the University of set-
ting wages according to market prices for jobs in the disciplines." [d. at 705. For an 
excellent presentation of the comparable worth theory see Note, Equal Pay, Comparable 
Work and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L. J. 657 (1981); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, 
Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF 399 
(1979). The basic premise of comparable worth appears to be that the market does not 
accurately compensate people for the value of their work because of pervasive discrimi-
nation based on job classifications traditionally held by women. Compare, Nelson, Opton 
and Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 
13 U. MICH. J. L. REF 233 (1980) and Beller, The Economics of Enforcement of an An-
tidiscrimination Law: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 J. L. AND ECON. 359 
(1978). 
48. 740 F.2d at 705. 
49. [d. at 706. 
50. [d. It is interesting to note that the court stated that Gunther being a disparate 
treatment case was of no help in evaluating the nursing faculty's impact claim. [d. at 
705. The court cited and discussed with approval other cases which had rejected compa-
rable worth. See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F. 2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F. 2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich. 1982). The Ninth Circuit stated: 
"We agree ... and join those courts in refusing to accept a construction of Title 
VII ... whenever employees of different sexes receive disparate compensation for work of 
differing skills that may, subjectively, be of equal value to the employer, but does not 
command an equal price in the labor market." 740 F.2d at 707. 
51. [d. at 708-09. The nurses advanced four arguments each of which they claimed 
would provide a foundation for their discriminatory impact claim. The first was that by 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The Spaulding decision is important because it may have 
significant impact on future sex-based wage discrimination 
cases. Although the court was unanimous in its decision, Judge 
Schroeder, in a special concurrence, did not join the court in its 
holding that comparable worth is not available to plaintiffs 
under the Title VII disparate impact model. II2 Since plaintiffs 
disclaimed having presented any comparable worth theory in 
their brief,1I3 the court's holding may be criticized as premature. 
However, the Ninth Circuit, by this opinion, continues to 
lead in determining the contours of Title VII sex-discrimination 
employment cases. By precluding plaintiffs from raising compa-
rable worth arguments under the disparate impact model, the 
court is setting a trend which other courts will probably follow. 1I4 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit may also be ready to limit the con-
tours of comparable worth on the disparate treatment model. lIl1 
Although it was unclear from Gunther how much leeway the 
court would allow in Title VII cases,1I6 the court can now be seen 
using the market to set wages, the University had violated Title VII. The court rejected 
this argument and held that disparate impact analysis does not apply when competitive 
market prices are paid. Plaintiffs advanced three other facially neutral policies, all of 
which were rejected. Id. at 708-09. 
52. Id. at 709-10. Judge Schroeder argued that the majority's analysis of this issue 
"confusedly meshe[d) adverse impact with varying concepts of comparable worth." Id. at 
710. Furthermore, it was argued that it was inappropriate for the court to "render any 
definitive ruling on the validity of comparable worth as a tool in employment discrimina-
tion cases." Id. This is because plaintiff's had only tried to compare work, not worth. In 
conclusion he stated, "the confusion is evident ... [in) the majority opinion in which the 
majority fails to define what it means by comparable worth." Id. 
53. Id. at 710. 
54. The Ninth Circuit approvingly cites Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721 (w.n. Mich. 1982), where the district court held that although Title VII allows a cause of 
action to be stated for jobs that are not equal or substantially equal of intentional dis-
crimination is shown, evidence of comparable worth cannot be used under the disparate 
impact model of Title VII. Id. at 726. The court stated that it "cannot and will not, 
evaluate different jobs and determine their worth to an employer or to society and then, 
on that basis alone, determine whether Title VII or the Equal Pay Act has been vio-
lated." Id. at 726-27. 
55. The recently decided American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees (AFSCME) v. State of Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (w.n. Wash. 1983) is cur-
rently being reviewed by the Ninth Circuit. The district court had ruled that the State of 
Washington violated Title VII when, under its job classification system, predominately 
female job categories were paid less than male job categories involving comparable skill, 
accountability and working conditions. 33 F.E.P. 808 (w.n. Wash. 1983). 
56. 740 F.2d at 700. 
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as giving a clear direction in this area. It is evident from the 
strong language of this opinion that the Ninth Circuit is unwill-
ing to interfere in an employer's determination of wage compen-
sation based on the competitive job market. Ii? This may be wise 
because Title VII is concerned with assuring equal access to jobs 
regardless of sex, to jobs and not with equalizing pay for differ-
ent jobs.1i8 In this light the Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence is 
commendable. 
Douglas M. Buchanan* 
57. Scholars and courts have pointed out that a large variety of non-discriminatory 
factors may be at work in creating or perpetrating the employment of women to only 
certain job categories. These may include familial and peer expectations, desire for part-
time work, or work with flexible hours, reluctance to pioneer in non-traditional jobs and 
lack of information about higher paying jobs. 
58. See supra note 5. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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